
Both legal and cultural discourses of the Revolutionary to Reconstruction periods in the U.S. imagined a biopolitical ideal populace that incorporated the labor of Black bodies while exiling any clear recognition of black personhood, which I term a form of
decorporation. This paper argues that we must understand the ways in which these early court decisions, notably in Virginia and North Carolina, bifurcated Black personhood from Black embodiment in order to fully understand how all forms of personhood took shape in early U.S. law and culture. This paper makes this argument through a close examination of early Virginia state court decisions that preserve full personhood, in Enlightenment terms, for white persons while instituting a logic of
decorporation for Black persons.
Significantly, this examination also provides a new frame for considering how race and personhood figure in literary and cultural voices of this period. I put Phillis Wheatley’s writings on imagination in conversation with Thomas Jefferson’s racial hierarchies and other descriptions of embodied experience – particularly under the condition of systemic slavery – to demonstrate how the logic of decorporation worked in legal and cultural terms. I argue that we must examine the nexus of law and public discourse in this period, and show that such an undertaking will force modern thinkers to reframe our understanding of law, race, and personhood in this period while raising crucial questions about how U.S. law and culture inherited and adapted Enlightenment principles of rights and citizenship.
Ashley Byock is a Fulbright Iceland scholar.